In our everyday lives, we are often engaged in making decisions, inferring causes for certain events and behaviours or pursuing important goals. These psychological processes more often than not are accompanied by a degree of uncertainty which can sometimes be an unpleasant experience. Kruglanski and colleagues (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995; Kruglanski et al., 2009; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) argued that this uncertainty would increase the motivation to reduce it by finding an answer on the issue at hand through rapid formulation of a hypothesis and its validation, as opposed to enduring further ambiguity (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This motivational tendency is termed Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC). For over forty years researchers intensively examined the way high in NFC people alleviate potential distress of uncertainty (for overview see Roets et al., 2015). As a result of coping with uncertainty, research has shown that high NFC individuals make more stereotypical judgments (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 1996), prefer consistent over inconsistent images (Gocłowska et al., 2017), prefer religious fundamentalists (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Kossowska et al., 2016) and endorse conservative beliefs (Kossowska & Hiel, 2003). Another way people tend to cope with uncertainty is by maintaining or restoring one’s personal control (Fritsche et al., 2013; Langer, 1975). While Kossowska and colleagues (2017) theoretically discussed the potential role of perceived control in dealing with uncertainty, there is very little and close to no empirical work showing this effect which our present research aims to establish.

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